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ESSAY
"DRIVING WHILE BLACK" AND ALL
OTHER TRAFFIC OFFENSES:
THE SUPREME COURT AND
PRETEXTUAL TRAFFIC STOPS
DAVID A. HARRIS*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court's decision in Whren v. United States' could not
have surprised many observers of the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In Whren, police officers used traffic violations as a pretext to stop a car and investigate possible drug offenses; the officers
had neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion to stop the
driver for narcotics crimes. 2 In the Supreme Court, the government
advocated the "could have" standard: any time the police could have
stopped the defendant for a traffic infraction, it does not matter that
police actually stopped him to investigate a crime for which the police
had little or no evidence. 3 The defense asked the Court to adopt a
"would have" rule: a seizure based on a traffic stop would only stand if
a reasonable officer would have made this particular stop. 4 The Court
sided with the government If police witness a traffic violation, the
* Eugene N. Balk Professor of Law and Values, University of Toledo College of Law.

J.D. 1983, Yale Law School; LL.M. 1988, Georgetown University Law Center. My thanks to
Jeffrey Gamso, Deborah Jeon, Mark Kappelhoff, Tom Perez, Daniel Steinbock and Lisa

Burget Wright for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this piece. Thanks also to Eric
Crytzer and Mary L. Sawyers for research and editorial assistance.
1 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996).

2 See infra notes 15 through 19 and accompanying text. To legally stop a person, a
police officer must have at least reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
S Brief for the United States at 5-6, United States v. Whren, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) (No.
95-5841).
4 Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1773 (defendant petitioners asked that the standard be "whether
a police officer, acting reasonably, would have made the stop for the reason given" (emphasis added)).
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Court said, they have the simplest and clearest type of probable cause
imaginable for a stop. 5 Requiring more would force lower courts to
make post hoc Fourth Amendment judgments based on either the
mindset of a reasonable officer or the actual (perhaps ulterior) motives of the arresting officer, neither one of which the Court saw as
necessary, useful, or relevant to the task ofjudging the constitutionality of a seizure.6 After Wren, courts will not ask whether police conducted a traffic stop because officers felt the occupants of the car were
involved in some other crime about which they had only a hunch;
rather, once a driver commits a traffic infraction, the officer's "real"
7
purpose will make no difference at all.
For the sake of of argument, I will concede that the decision in
Whren makes some sense, at least from the point of view of judicial
administration. But examined more carefully, Whren does more than
opt for a more workable rule: it approves two alarming law enforcement practices. Neither are secret; on the contrary, the law of search
and seizure has reflected both for a long time.8 But both represent
profoundly dangerous developments for a free society, especially one
dedicated to the equal treatment of all citizens.
First, the comprehensive scope of state traffic codes makes them
extremely powerful tools under Whren. These codes regulate the details of driving in ways both big and small, obvious and arcane. In the
most literal sense, no driver can avoid violating some traffic law during
a short drive, even with the most careful attention. Fairly read, Whren
says that any traffic violation can support a stop, no matter what the
real reason for it is; this makes any citizen fair game for a stop, almost
any time, anywhere, virtually at the whim of police. Given how important an activity driving has become in American society, Whren
changes the Fourth Amendment's rule that police must have a reason
5 Id. at 1772.
6 Id. at 1775-76.
7 Id.
8 See, e.g., infranote 27; WAYNE R. LAFAVE &JEROLD IsRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.1,
at 2 (1996 Supp.). Indeed, I would be remiss not to mention that the subject of pretextual
Fourth Amendment activity has garnered a considerable amount of attention over the
years. E.g., John M. Burkoff, The Court That Devoured the FourthAmendment: The Triumph of
an InconsistentExclusionaiy Doctrine,58 ORm. L REv. 151 (1979);John M. Burkoff, Bad Faith
Searches, 57 N.Y.U. L REv. 70 (1982);John M. Burkoff, The Pretext Search Doctrine: Now You
See It Now You Dont 17 U. MICH.J.L REP. 523 (1984);James B. Haddad, PreextualFourth
Amendment Acivity: Another Viewpoint, 18 U. MIcH. J.L. REF. 639 (1985); Rejoinder: Truth,
Justice, and the American Way-Or ProfessorHaddads Hard Choices, 18 U. MICH.J.1- REF. 695
(1985); 1 WAYNE R. IAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIzuRE: A TREAIrsE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
1.4(e) (3d ed. 1996). This excellent commentary has framed the debate well. But my
argument is different. Whren means that as long as a traffic infraction occurs-and one
almost always will-no inquiry into pretext of any type is even necessary.
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to forcibly interfere in our business-some basis to suspect wrongdoing that is more than a hunch. 9 Simply put, that rule no longer applies when a person drives a car.
This alone should worry us, but the second police practice Whren
approves is in fact far worse. It is this:' Police will not subject alldrivers
to traffic stops in the way Whren allows. Rather, if past practice is any
indication, they will use the traffic code to stop a hugely disproportionate number of African-Americans and Hispanics. We know this
because it is exactly what has been happening already, even before receiving the Supreme Court's imprimatur in Wren. In fact, the stopping
of black drivers, just to see what officers can find, has become so common in some places that this practice has its own name: AfricanAmericans sometimes say they have been stopped for the offense of
"driving while black."' 0 With Whren, we should expect African-Americans and Hispanics to experience an even greater number of pretextual traffic stops. And once police stop a car, they often search it,
either by obtaining consent, using a drug sniffing dog, or by some
other means." In fact, searching cars for narcotics is perhaps the major motivation for making these stops.
Under a Constitution that restrains the government vis-a-vis the
individual' 2 and that puts some limits on what the authorities may do
in the pursuit of the guilty, the power of the police to stop any particular driver, at almost any time, 13 seems oddly out of place. And with
9

[E]xcept in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that the
vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping an
automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his driver's license and the
registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
10 I heard this phrase often from clients I represented in Washington, D.C. and its
surrounding Maryland counties; among many of them, it was the standard way of describing the common experience of constant stops and harassment of blacks by police. Thus I
was not surprised to see the phrase show up recently in the popular press. E.g., Michael
Fletcher, Driven to Extremes: Black Men Take Steps to Avoid PoliceStops, WASH. POST, March 29,
1996, at Al (black men are stopped so often they say they are stopped for the offense one
of them "calls DWB-driving while black."). See also Henry Louis Gates, Thirteen Ways of
Looking at a Black Man, NEW YORKER, Oct. 23, 1995, at 59 (constant stops by police is what
.many African-Americans know as D.W.B.: Driving While Black.").
11 See infra notes 184-193 and accompanying text.
12 See, e.g., WAYNE I, LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, § 1.1, at 3-5 (1996) (Fourth Amendment grew out of English and colonial exper-

iences with abuses of general warrants and writs of assistance); Tracey Maclin, When the
Cure for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse Than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1994)
(noting that the history and purpose of Fourth Amendment is about limitation of executive and police power).
13 Indeed, described this way, the Court would no doubt disagree and say that police
behavior like this surely does violate the Fourth Amendment. E.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440
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the words "equal justice under law" carved into the stone of the
Supreme Court itself, one might think that the use of police power in
one of its rawest forms against members of particular racial or ethnic
groups might prompt the Court to show some interest in curbing such
abuses. 14 The defendant-petitioners presented both of these arguments-the almost arbitrary power over any driver inherent in the
"could have" approach, and the racially biased use of traffic stops-to
the Court. Yet the Court paid little attention to these obvious implications of its decision. Whren is more than a missed opportunity for the
Court to rein in some police practices that strike at the heart of the
ideas of freedom and equal treatment; Whren represents a clear step in
the other direction-toward authoritarianism, toward racist policing,
and toward a view of minorities as criminals, rather than citizens.
II.

THE CASE

Whren presented the Court with relatively simple facts. Plain
clothes vice officers in an unmarked police car saw two young men
driving a vehicle with temporary tags in an area known for drug activity. 15 The police observed the vehicle pause at a stop sign for longer
than usual. 16 While the officers did not see the men do anything to
indicate involvement in criminal activity, they still became suspicious. 1 7 The driver turned without signalling and sped off.18 The po-

lice stopped the vehicle, and observed the passenger holding a bag of
cocaine in each hand. 19
The government argued that the traffic violations the driver committed-not giving "full time and attention to the operation of the
vehicle, '2 0 failing to signal,2 ' and travelling at a speed "greater than is
U.S. 648 (1979) (random stops of automobiles prohibited). This may be true, but my
intent is to describe what the law does, not what it says.
14 Brief for Petitioners at 17-30, Wren (No. 95-5841).
15 Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996). Both of the young men were
African-Americans.
16 Id.

17 Id. While the Court's opinion notes that the occupants were "youthful," that the
vehicle was "a dark Pathfinder," and that the driver seemed to be looking down into the
lap of the passenger, id., there was no indication of criminal activity. As the Brief for the
Petitioners notes, the main officer involved testified that the stop of the car was performed
not to investigate specific acts of the occupants indicating criminality, but simply to speak
to the driver about his poor driving. Brief for Petitioners, Whren, at 5-7 (No. 95-5841).
This seems a transparently obvious lie; with Whren on the books, police will have no reason
to tell such stories, since pretextua stops have been approved, and no "innocent" motivation need be voiced for the court reviewing a motion to suppress.
18 Wren, 116 S. Ct. at 1772.
19 Id.

20 18 D.C. Mun. Regs. § 2218.4 (1995).
21 Id. at § 2204.3.
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reasonable and prudent under the conditions" 22-gave
the police
probable cause to stop the car. The government contended that with
probable cause arising from the traffic violations, the stop of the car
passed constitutional standards, regardless of the fact that the officers
may actually have intended to investigate drug offenses and not traffic
infractions.2 3 The defense asserted that the officers had no actual interest in traffic enforcement, and had used the traffic infraction only
as a pretext. For the real objective of the police-searching for evidence of possible drug offenses-no probable cause or reasonable
suspicion existed.2 4 The defense contended that this made the stop
(and the resulting seizure of the cocaine) unconstitutional.2 5 The
District Court admitted the evidence, and at trial both defendants
were found guilty.2 6 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, stating that "a traffic stop is permissible as
long as a reasonable officer in the same circumstances could have
stopped the car for the suspected traffic violation," despite the fact
that the officer may subjectively believe that those in the car may be
27
engaging in some other illegal behavior.
The Supreme Court adopted the "could have" theory. The Court
said that any time a police officer observes a traffic violation, she has
probable cause to stop the vehicle, regardless of the fact that the detailed nature of traffic codes enables any officer that wishes to do so to
stop virtually any motorist at almost any time by using the traffic in22

Id. at § 2200.3.

23

When a police officer has observed a motorist commit a traffic offense, the officer has
probable cause tojustify a stop.... [A]ny argument [to the contrary] ...conflicts with
this Court's teaching that the validity of a search or a seizure under the Fourth
Amendment turns on an objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of the
facts and circumstances confronting him at the time ....
Brief for the United States, Whren, at 7-8 (No. 95-5841).
24 Transcript, U.S. v. Whren, U.S. D. Ct, D.D.C., Nos. 93-cr00274-01 and 93-cr00274-02,
at 122-24, 126-30; see also Brief for Petitioners, Whren, at 1-14 (No. 95-5841).
25 Transcript, supra note 24, at 124, 130; Brief for Petitioners, Whren, at 14 (No. 955841).
26 Id. at 10-11.
27 Whren v. United States, 53 F.3d 371, 374-75 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The D.C. Circuit's
decision put it in line with eight other circuits that had adopted some form of the "could
have" rule. U.S. v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc); U.S. v.
Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir. 1995), petitionfor cert. filed, No. 95-6724 (Nov. 13, 1995);
U.S. v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 782-84 (2d Cir 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 207 (1994); U.S. v.
Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 389-91 (6th Cir. 1993) (en banc), cert. denied 115 S.Ct. 97 (1994);
U.S. v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726, 729-30 (4th Cir. 1993) cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1374 (1994); U.S.
v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 500-01 (8th Cir. 1990); U.S. v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037, 1039 (7th
Cir. 1989); U.S. v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1184 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc). Two other
circuits had adopted the "would have" rule. U.S. v. Cannon, 29 F.3d 472, 475-76 (9th Cir.
1994); U.S. v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 709 (11th Cir. 1986).
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fraction as a pretext.2 8 The Court discounted statements in prior

29
cases that seemed to cast pretextual stops in an unfavorable light,
and stated that the law actually supported the opposite proposition:
An officer's motive does not "invalidate[ ] objectively reasonable be-

havior under the Fourth Amendment." 0 Relying heavily on United
States v. Robinson3 1 and Scott v. United States,3 2 the Court said that the
officer's state of mind in a Fourth Amendment situation is irrelevant,
"as long as the circumstances viewed objectively, justify that action." 33
"We think," the Court went on, that Robinson and other cases "foreclose any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic
stops depends on the actual motivation of the individual officers
involved."34
Addressing the "would have" standard that the defendant proposed, the Court rejected the notion that the results of a suppression
motion should turn on whether a reasonable officer, under the police
practices and regulations in the jurisdiction in which the case arose,
35
would have made the stop for the purposes of traffic enforcement.
Trial courts would find such a test much too difficult to administer,
the Court said, and would end up "speculating about the hypothetical
reaction of a hypothetical constable-an exercise that might be called
virtual subjectivity."3 6 The result would be that the application of
Fourth Amendment law would vary from place to place, depending on
police regulations and practices, a result the Court found unacceptable.3 7 But the Court failed to acknowledge that the district court in
Whren would not have needed to speculate to apply the "would have"
standard. District of Columbia Police regulations prohibited officers
in plain clothes and officers in unmarked vehicles from making traffic
stops unless the violations posed an immediate threat to others.38
The officers clearly violated this rule in Whren; thus, there is little
28 Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772-1773 (1996).
29 Id. at 1773-74 (citing Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990) (impoundment of vehicles);
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) (same); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987)
(administrative inspections of businesses)).
30 Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774.
31 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
32 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
33 Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774 (quoting Scott, 436 U.S. at 138).
34 Id. at 1774.
35 Id. at 1775.

36 Id.

Id. at 1775.
D.C. Metropolitan Police Department General Order 303.1 (Traffic Enforcement)
(eff. April 30, 1992) ("Traffic enforcement may be undertaken as follows: ... Members
who are not in uniform or are in unmarked vehicles may take enforcement action only in
the case of a violation that is so grave as to pose an immediate threat to the safety of
others.").
37
38
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doubt that their conduct was not what a reasonable officer in their
department would do, at least assuming that a reasonable officer follows regulations. Additionally, there was no doubt that their traffic
enforcement actions were a pretext for drug investigation without
39
probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
The Court gave short shrift to the argument that police would use
the power to make traffic stops disproportionately against minorities.
Of course, the Constitution forbids racially biased law enforcement,
the Court said, but the proper source for a remedy is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment. 4° Dismissing this point in
a few tepid lines buried in the middle of the opinion, the Court read
the racial question out of the case without any substantive discussion.
The real reasons police act, as opposed to the legal justification proffered for their actions, "play no role in ordinary, probable-cause
Fourth Amendment analysis." 4 1 It is difficult to say what is more striking: the blandness of these words, or the blindness of what they assert.
The Court's brief treatment of a position so central to the petitioners' case suggests that the Justices may not have taken the argument seriously. But it is the substance of the Court's answer, not its
39 The main officer involved in the case testified that he was "out there almost strictly to
do drug investigations" and that he stops drivers for traffic offenses "[n ] ot very often at all."
Transcript, supra note 24, at 78. Despite these statements, and the fact that the district
judge was troubled by a "lengthy pause" before the officer's answer to the question
whether he in fact stopped the vehicle because he was suspicious of a new car with two
young black men inside, id. at 66-67, 76-77, 138, the court found the traffic stop proper
under the "could have" test.
The Court also declared that the case need not be resolved by a balancing of interests.
Past cases, the Court said, made a balancing of the government's interest in such stops
against the individual's interests in freedom from such interference necessary only in situations without probable cause or in cases featuring an extraordinary search or seizure-for
example, seizing a fleeing suspect by using deadly force. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1776 (citing
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (balancing interests to determine that using deadly
force to seize a fleeing felon is an unreasonable seizure)). Since, by hypothesis, probable
cause exists in a pretextual traffic stop case, courts need not do any balancing because
"[t]he making of a traffic stop out-of-uniform does not remotely qualify as such an extreme
practice." Id. at 1777. While a stop by an individual in plain clothes in a nondescript car
may not be as "extreme" as shooting someone, the experience could still be quite frightening or even dangerous. See, e.g., State v. Auxter, No. OT-96-004, 1996 WL 475926, at *2
(Ohio Ct. App. August 23, 1996) (drunk driving case dismissed because officer made stop
and arrest in unmarked car, and Ohio law prohibits officer who does so from testifying in
case in order to curb abusive use of speed traps and "to providefor the safety of persons being
stopped" (emphasis added)); Rose Kim, Family Wants Answers, NEWSDAY, March 20, 1996, at 4
(family members allege that physician killed by police officers because police officers were
in unmarked cars and not in uniform, precipitating violent incident); Pennsylvania Bill
Would Bar Use of Unmarked Police Cars, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1996, at A12 (proposed bill
targeted at crimes by police impostors using unmarked cars).
40 Whren, 116 U.S. at 1774.
41 Id.
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brevity, that confirms this feeling. On the practical level, equal protection will provide few of those subjected to this treatment with any
solace; indeed, for each of the few successful suits brought to protest
racially biased law enforcement practices, 42 police may stop and
search thousands of people who have no hope of redress. They do
not have the resources, knowledge, or wherewithal to complain; they
have learned that complaining about this treatment brings nothing
(except maybe trouble), or that they may make unattractive plaintiffs
unlikely to engender any jury's sympathy, regardless of the injuries to
their rights. 43
Aside from these practical considerations, the Court's reference
to the Equal Protection Clause seems to mean that persons aggrieved
by racially biased stops and searches should attempt a statistical demonstration that pretextual traffic stops have a racially disproportionate
impact. But plaintiffs in such suits would have to confront the Court's
long-standing precedents barring proof of equal protection claims by
a showing of disparate impact. 44 Moreover, the Court has shown hos42 See infra notes 89-161 and accompanying text.
43 See infra note 120.
44 In making this suggestion, the Court seemed to ignore its cases, which say disparate
racial impact of a practice or policy is not enough to prove a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Rather, to prove such a violation, "the invidious quality of a law claimed to be
racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose."
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976); see alsoVillage of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65, 271 (1977) (proof of racially
discriminatory aim is required to show a violation of the equal protection clause, and inference of discriminatory "ultimate effect" did not make out a constitutional claim). While
the exact contours of what the Court would require in order to make out a claim remain
unclear, Davis and the cases that follow seem to say that lawsuits over the racially discriminatory effect of facially race-neutral rules are to be "conducted as a search for a bigoted
decision-maker," LAwaR.cE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTitrIONAL LAw 1509 (2d ed. 1988), a
difficult standard to meet in contemporary America. Thus a case like that of Robert Wilkins, see infra notes 112-134 and accompanying text, may succeed, since the evidence uncovered in the case includes an actual memorandum explicitly targeting black men for
pretextual stops. But the Wilkins case will prove to be the rare exception, because in most
cases decision-makers will not commit such ideas to paper. The only equal protection
cases that might provide some underpinning for the Court's equal protection suggestion
in Whren are the peremptory challenge cases, in which discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges may make out a prima facie case of discrimination that an adversary must then
explain as stemming from nonracial reasons. E.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)
(applying rule to prosecutor's use of peremptories in criminal case); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (applying rule to civil cases); Powers v. Ohio, 499
U.S. 400 (1991) (exclusion of white jurors in trial of black defendant prohibited). But the
underlying rationale of these cases has to do notjust with discriminatory racial impact and
equal protection, but with bar-ing particular groups from an important civic functionjury service-and in the undermining of public confidence in the jury system that might
then result. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87; Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 48-50 (1992) (same).
Thus it is not at all clear that the Court would find the peremptory challenge cases
applicable.
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tility toward the demonstration of constitutional violations through
statistics. In McCleskey v. Kemp,45 a statistical study showed undeniable
racial patterns in the administration of the death penalty in Georgia.
If the victim was white and the perpetrator was black, the state sought
the death penalty 70 percent of the time;46 if the victim was black and
the defendant was white, the state sought the death penalty in only 19
percent of the cases. 47 If the victim and defendant were either both
white or both black, the figures were 32 percent and 15 percent, respectively.48 McCleskey claimed that the statistics demonstrated that

he was discriminated against because of his race and the race of his
victim. 4 9 As striking as these statistics may have been, the Court found
them meaningless. "At most," the Court said, "the . . . [statistical]

study indicates a discrepancy that appears to correlate with race," but
it "does not demonstrate a constitutionally significant risk of racial
bias affecting the Georgia capital-sentencing process." 50 McCleskey,
the Court said, "must prove that the decision-makers in his case acted
with discriminatory purpose."5 ' In other words, only evidence of racial animus of the most direct nature in the defendant's own case
could prove an equal protection violation; statistical proof showing
patterns of racial bias, the more logical way to demonstrate discrimi52
natory application of the law, would be unacceptable.
Another example is United States v. Armstrong,5 3 a selective prosecution case decided during the same Supreme Court term as Whren.
In Armstrong, the defendants presented a study that showed that all 24
crack cocaine cases the district federal public defender had closed
over the prior year involved only black defendants. 54 Finding this evidence insufficient, the Court sided with the government and made
the already daunting challenge of proving a selective prosecution
claim even more difficult: the defendant will have no right of access to
the prosecutor's files unless he first introduces evidence that the prosecutor did not prosecute others similarly situated and acted out of
racial hostility in the defendant's case.5 5 Thus, the defendant must
45 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
46 Id. at 287.
47 Id.

48 Id.
49 Id. at 292.
50 Id. at 312-13.
51 Id. at 292.
52 But cf.United States v. Gordon, 817 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1987) (error to reject "racial impact or results evidence," given defendant's allegations of selective prosecution of
vote fraud laws by targeting majority-Black counties).
53 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996).
54 Id. at 1483.
55 Id. at 1488-89.
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furnish evidence of the correctness of his claim, without access to the
very evidence needed to prove his claim-a Catch 22 if ever there was
one.56

McClesky and Armstrong make a jarring backdrop for the Court's
blithe assertion in Whren that the Equal Protection Clause represents
the proper way to address claims of discrimination in law enforcement It is hard to avoid the conclusion that, given McClesky and Armstrong, the Justices do not mean for many equal protection cases to
succeed.
Even though I disagree strongly with some parts of Whren, I will
concede for the sake of argument that the Court's reasoning is not
entirely wrong. There is no question that it will be easier for lower
courts to work with the "could have" rule than the "would have" rule.
The "could have" rule requires very little evidence; the officer need
only testify that she observed a traffic violation and stopped the car.
The court will either believe the testimony or reject it.5 7 By contrast,
the "would have" test might require testimony about regular police
practices, departmental regulations, and in the end a judgment from
the court about whether the actions of the officer in a particular case
were those a reasonable officer would have taken. These difficulties
do not persuade me that courts could not cope with a "would have"
rule; in fact, they make such judgments all the time in Terry stop cases,
which require a decision about the reasonableness of the officer's actions in a given situation. 58 Nevertheless, the "could have" test would
no doubt prove easier to administer.
To be sure, there are negative points to the opinion beyond those
I have already mentioned. For example, one can make a good argument that the Court used a strained reading of its cases to reject the
"would have" test. This seems especially true of the Court's treatment
of Robinson. The Court was correct in Whren: Robinson said that the
actual motivation of the officer does not determine the search's objec56 SeeDavid Cole, SeeNoEvil; HearNo Evil; LEGAL TIMES,July 29, 1996, atS29 ("In effect,
one must provide evidence of one's claim without access to the very evidence necessary to
establish the claim.").
57 Given that lower courts nearly always take the word of the officer in these matters,
even when it is obvious that the officer is lying, it seems unlikely in the extreme that courts
will disbelieve officers' proffered justifications based on the traffic stops which Whren permits. See, e.g., David A. Harris, FriskingEvery Suspect: The Withering of Terry, 28 U.C. DAvis L.
Rnv. 1, 6 (1994) (testifying falsely on search and seizure issues is an accepted practice in
lower courts); Alan M. Dershowitz, Accomplices to Perjury, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1994, at A15
(when judges accept perjurious police testimony, they bear responsibility for it).
58 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968) (the question is whether "the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate").
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five reasonableness. 59 But this is hardly a fair description of the actual
thrust of the case. Robinson posed the question whether the search of
the defendant incident to arrest met constitutional standards. The
facts did not point to any danger to police or to the destruction of any
evidence-the twin justifications for a search incident to an arrest until the Robinson decision. 60 Nevertheless, the Court in Robinson found
that the arrest alone justified the search. In other words, a full search
can always follow a legitimate arrest; that is, an arrest which police
make for the purpose of apprehending an offender, not for the purpose of making the search. Thus, while the irrelevancy of the actual
beliefs of the officer is consistent with the rest of Robinson, it hardly
seems substantial enough to be the basis of the decision in Whren.
Indeed, from the point of view of the proper use of cases and doctrine, the Court should simply have conceded in Whren that precedent
did not supply a ready answer to the question of how to handle pretextual stops. The opinion could have said (1) our cases do not dictate
which way to decide this issue, so (2) we think the "could have" rule
clearly preferable for reasons ofjudicial administration, police understanding of the rule, and crime control.
But these arguments are not the primary reasons that Whren
should disturb us. The real danger of Whren is not its use of precedent, its facile logic, or its rejection of one proposed test for another.
Rather, Whren's most troubling aspects lie in its implications-the incredible amount of discretionary power it hands law enforcement
without any check-and what this means for our everyday lives and
our freedom as citizens.
III.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND TRAFI.c OFFENSES

Commentators have criticized the Supreme Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, with considerable justification. As the
Court lurches between protecting what it considers bedrock Fourth
Amendment values-the sanctity of the home, for example 6 1 -and
the undesirable and distasteful result of suppressing probative evidence of guilt, it has generated a hodgepodge of conflicting rules so
technical that law professors-let alone law enforcers-find them difficult to understand. 62 Even so, some basic search and seizure rules
59 WreY, 116 S. Ct. at 1774, (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n.1

and 236 (1973)).
60 See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
61 See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980) (the Fourth Amendment

prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's
home in order to make a routine felony arrest).
62 E.g., Akhil Reed Amar, FourthAmendment FirstPrinciples, 107 HARv. L. REV. 757 (1994)
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seem firmly ensconced in the law. Perhaps this is because they are so
fundamental that disturbing them would create an even larger doctrinal mess than the one that already exists; perhaps it is because there is
present-day consensus accompanied by historical evidence on these
points. Whatever the reason, we can discuss two key rules, secure in
the knowledge that they are accepted by the Court.
First, the police must usually have a reason to forcibly stop a person. 63 When I say "forcibly stop," I do not mean the application of
force to a suspect, though that may be part of a seizure. And I am not
referring to casual encounters with police, in which a citizen is asked
whether he or she would mind talking to police. Even though it
seems more than just plausible to argue that such encounters always
carry with them some element of coercion, 64 I am willing to accept,
for the purposes of argument, the idea that such encounters remain
consensual. In contrast, a forcible stop is by its nature coercive.
When a police officer orders a citizen to halt, questioning, a search of
some kind, or even arrest may follow. Police cannot force a citizen to
stop and submit in this way without probable cause or at least reasonable suspicion to believe that a crime has been or is about to be committed by the suspect. 65 The Supreme Court reaffirmed this standard
just a few years ago in Minnesota v. Dickerson,6 6 in which Justice White
stated clearly that this rule had not changed. The police must still
have a reason to force a citizen to stop and submit to their authority,
67
something more than just a hunch.
The other basic rule important to our discussion is this: if police
(describing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as a mess); Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of
the FourthAmendment, 83 MicH. L. REV. 1468 (1985) (chaotic state of Fourth Amendment

law comes from the pulling of courts between the poles of following the law as decided in
previous cases and suppressing evidence, and the desire to have the evidence of crime that
will convict the guilty admiited).
63 Teny v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), is of course the source of the rule that at least reasonable suspicion is necessary for a stop. I say this is usually the rule, because there are exceptions, such as the cases in which there is a special governmental need, e.g., Michigan Dep't
of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (permitting suspicionless searches at roadblocks
due to the special need to fight drunk driving), or administrative searches, e.g., NewYork v.
Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (administrative inspection ofjunkyards).
64 Tracey Maclin, "Black and Blue Encounters"-Some Preliminary Thoughts about Fourth
Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VA. U. L. Rzv. 243, 249-50 (1991) (describing
encounters between police and citizens as always carrying some element of coerciveness).
65 Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. Even in the context of a Terry stop, the same rules have always
applied. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Terry makes this clear. Without a justifiable stop, Harlan said, officers could not frisk to assure their safety. It is the right to stop
the suspect in the first place that justifies getting close enough to the suspect that the
officer might be in danger;, the police cannot generate that danger by putting themselves
at risk in the first place. Id. at 32-33 (Harlan, J., concurring).
66 508 U.S. 366 (1993).
67 Id. at 372-73.
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do not have the probable cause or reasonable suspicion necessary for
a forcible stop, a citizen may ignore police requests to stop, respond to
questions, produce identification, or submit to any further intrusion.
The Supreme Court has reiterated this rule in a number of cases
stretching over many years. For example, in Brown v. Texas,68 police
69
stopped a man in an area with a "high incidence of drug traffic"
because "the situation 'looked suspicious and we had never seen [the]
subject in that area before.' 70 The officers arrested the man under a
Texas statute that criminalized any refusal to give police a name and
address upon a legitimate stop. 71 The Supreme Court invalidated the
statute, and declared that nothing in the facts of the case allowed the
officers to make a legitimate stop, even the defendant's presence in an
area known for narcotics trafficking. The defendant had every right
to walk away and to refuse to produce identification in such a situation, and any law to the contrary did not meet constitutional stan7 3
dards. 72 The Court carried this doctrine forward in F/orida v. RoyerF
in which it stated that "[a citizen] may not be detained even momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so; and his refusal
to listen or answer does not, without more, furnish those grounds."74
And in Floridav. Bostick, 75 the Court reaffirmed this principle, declaring that while the police may question a person about whom they have
no suspicion, "an individual may decline an officer's request without
fearing prosecution." 76
To be sure, I have not made the mistake of assuming that these
legal rules necessarily reflect reality. I know that even though the
cases discussed here may guarantee citizens the right to walk away
from curious police without interference, the right may exist more in
theory than in practice. 77 It may be that the mere appearance of au68 443 U.S. 47 (1979).

69 Id. at 49.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at

52-53. See also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 92-93 (1979) (holding that police
had no reasonable suspicion to detain the customer of a tavern, even if the police had a
warrant to search the tavern and a general suspicion that drug sales took place at the
tavern, when there was no indication that the customer himself was involved or armed).
73 460 U.S. 491 (1983).

74 Id. at 498 (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) ("a citizen who
does not wish to answer police questions may disregard the officers questions and walk
away")).
75 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
76 Id. at 437.
77 Professor Tracey Maclin has made this point in a persuasive way- It is all very well to
say that a citizen need not respond to police inquiries; it is another to ask how many would
actually resist and why they should have to do so. "The point is not [only] that very few
persons will have the moxie to assert their fourth amendment rights, although we know
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thority-nothing more than the officer's uniform, badge and squad
car, to say nothing of her weapon-will cause most people to do what
she says or answer her questions. But the point is that even if the law
remains more an ideal than anything else, the Court's pronouncements on the subject all point in one direction: the police need at
least reasonable suspicion to forcibly interfere with one's movement,
and if they do not have it the citizen may walk away.
Whren alters all of this for anyone driving a car. Simply put, it is
difficult to imagine a more American activity than driving a car. We
use our cars for everything: work (both as transportation to get to and
from work and as mobile offices and sales platforms), play, and myriad other activities that make up everyday life. Of course, many Americans do not own cars, and some have even found it unnecessary to
learn to drive. But this is not the norm. Most American kids date
their emergence from adolescence not from high school graduation
or a religious or cultural ceremony, but from something far more central to what they really value: the day they receive their driver's
licenses. Americans visiting Europe for the first time often return with
the observation that one can get to and from almost any little town
entirely on public transportation. Europeans visiting America are
often surprised at the lack of public transportation facilities and options outside of major urban Centers, and at the sizeable cities that rely
entirely on automobile transportation. Despite energy crises, traffic
congestion, and the expense of owning a car, most Americans prefer
to drive wherever they go.78 In short, there are few activities more
79
important to American life than driving.
With that in mind, consider traffic codes. There is no detail of
driving too small, no piece of equipment too insignificant, no item of
automobile regulation too arcane to be made the subject of a traffic
that most will not. It is whether citizens in a free society should be forced to challenge the
police in order to enjoy [their rights]." Tracey Maclin, TheDedine of the Right of Locomotion:
The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75 CoRN'ELL L. Rnv. 1258, 1306 (1990). Professor
Maclin has also argued that the situation may be worse for some members of our society
than for others, depending on the color of their skin. MACUN, supra note 63, at 251-53
(describing numerous less-than-legal encounters between police and black men).
78 Thus it was no accident when, several years ago, the company that provides "genuine" General Motors parts and service for that company's automotive products ran a series
of commercials in which a chorus of hearty voices sang out the words: "It's not just your
car, it's your freedom." This jingle represented a perfect blending of the American attitude toward the automobile-the essential part of life, without which one surrenders the
"freedom" to come and go at will-with a huckster's willingness to appropriate patriotic
feelings and symbolism.
79 Steven Stark, Weekend Edition Sunday: America's Long-Term Love Affair with the Automoi (National Public Radio broadcast, Aug. 18, 1996) ("It's virtually impossible to overstate
the importance of the car in American life.").
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offense. Police officers in some jurisdictions have a rule of thumb: the
average driver cannot go three blocks without violating some traffic
regulation. Reading the codes, it is hard to disagree; the question is
how anyone could get as far as three blocks without violating the law.
When we think of traffic offenses, we think of "moving violations"-exceeding the speed limit, crossing dividing lines, and the
like. But in fact traffic codes regulate many other aspects of drivingrelated activity, including some that seem almost wildly hypertechnical. And some of these offenses have nothing to do with driving at all.
Rather, they are "equipment violafions"-offenses in which driving
with incorrect, outdated, or broken equipment constitutes the violation. And then there are catch-all provisions: rules that allow police to
stop drivers for conduct that complies with all rules on the books, but
that officers consider "imprudent" or "unreasonable" under the circumstances, or that describe the offense in language so broad as to
make a violation virtually coextensive with the officer's unreviewable
personal judgment.
For example, in any number ofjurisdictions, police can stop drivers not only for driving too fast, but for driving too slow.80 In Utah,
drivers must signal for at least three seconds before changing lanes; a
two second signal would violate the law.8 ' In many states, a driver
must signal for at least one hundred feet before turning right; ninetyfive feet would make the driver a offender.8 2 And the driver making
that right turn may not slow down "suddenly" (undefined) without
signalling.8 3 Many states have made it a crime to drive with a malfunctioning taillight,8 4 a rear-tag illumination bulb that does not work,8 5 or
80 E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-7-305 (Michie 1994) (prohibits driving "at such a slow
speed as to impede the normal and reasonable movement of traffic"); 18 D.C. Mun. Regs.
§ 2200.10 (1995).
81 UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-669 (1993).
82 MD. CODE ANN. TRANsP.II § 21-604(d) (signal must "be given continuously during at
least the last 100 feet"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-7-325B (Michie 1994) (same); OHio REv.
CODE ANN. § 4511.39 (Banks-Baldwin 1993) (same); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-2150(b) (Law
Co-op. 1991) (same).
83 E.g., MD. CODE ANN. TRANsP. II § 21-604(e) (1992) ("If there is an opportunity to
signal, a person may not stop or suddenly decrease the speed of a vehicle until he gives an
appropriate signal"); N.M. CODE ANN. § 66-7-325C (1994) ("No person shall stop or suddenly decrease the speed of a vehicle without first giving an appropriate signal.. ."); S.C.
CODE ANN.§ 56-5-2150(c) (Law Co-op. 1991) (same).
84 E.g., MD. CODE ANN. TRANsP.ll § 22-204(a) (1992) ("[e]very motor vehicle.., shall
be equipped with at least 2 tail lamps mounted on the rear, which.., shall emit a red light
plainly visible from a distance of 1000 feet to the rear"); N.D. CENT.CODE § 39-21-04(1)
(1987) (same); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-4510 (Law Co-op. 1991) (same, except that red light
must be visible from a distance of 500 feet).
85 E.g., MD. CODE ANN. TRANsp. II § 22-204(f) (1992) (requiring "a white light" that will
illuminate the rear registration plate "and render it clearly visible from a distance of fifty
feet"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 89-21-04(3) (1987) (same); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-4530 (Law
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tires without sufficient tread.8 6 They also require, drivers to display
not only license tags, but yearly validation stickers, pollution control
stickers, and safety inspection stickers; driving without these items dis87
played on the vehicle in the proper place violates the law.
If few drivers are aware of the true scope of traffic codes and the
limitless opportunities they give police to make pretextual stops, police officers have always understood this point. For example, the statements by police officers that follow come from a book written in 1967:
You can always get a guy legitimately on a traffic violation if you tail him
for a while, and then a search can be made.
You don't have to follow a driver very long before he will move to the
other side of the yellow line and then you can arrest and search him for
driving on the wrong side of the highway.
In the event that we see a suspicious automobile or occupant and wish to
search the person or the car, or both, we will usually follow the vehicle
until the driver makes a technical violation 88of a traffic
% law. Then we
have a means of making a legitimate search.
These officers may not fully understand search and seizure law;
for example, even in 1967, it was far from clear that a search could
follow any traffic stop that police "legitimately" made. But they are
absolutely correct on the larger point: with the traffic code in hand,
any officer can stop any driver any time. The most the officer will
have to do is "tail [a driver] for a while," and probable cause will materialize like magic. Whren is the Supreme Court's official blessing of
this practice, despite the fact that police concede that they use this
technique to circumvent constitutional requirements.
But the existence of powerful and unreviewable police discretion
to stop drivers is not the most disturbing aspect of Whren. That dubious honor is reserved for the ways in which the police will use this
discretion.
Co-op. 1991) (same).

86 E.g., MD. CODE ANN. TRANSP. II § 22-405.5(b) (1992) (tire considered unsafe if tread
wear indicators are "flush with the tread at any place on the tire" or, in absence of tread
wear indicators, do not meet precise measurements at three locations on the tire); S.C.
C DE ANN. § 56-5-5040 (Law Co-op. 1991) (tires "shall be in a safe operating condition").
87 E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-5350(a) (Law Co-op. 1991) ("No person shall drive...
any vehicle ... unless there shall be in effect and properly displayed thereon a current
certificate of inspection").
88 LAWRENCE F. Tirn
, ET AL., DE ErE ON OF CRIME 131 (1967). In its most recent case
on traffic stops, in which the Supreme Court gave police making these stops the power to
order passengers out of vehicles without any suspicion of wrongdoing or danger, Justice
Kennedy's dissent points outjust how powerful a tool Wren is. Maryland v. Wilson, No. 951268, 1997 U.S. Lexis 1271 (Feb. 19, 1997) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (when coupled with
Whren's grant of power to "stop vehicles in almost countless circumstances," majority opinion in Wilson "puts tens of millions of passengers at risk of arbitrary control by the
police.").
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STOPPED?

Once we understand that Whren will permit police to stop anyone
driving a car whenever they observe the ever-present violations of the
traffic code, the question becomes who the police will stop. At first
blush, the question might seem unnecessary. After all, if Whren allows
the police to stop any driver at virtually any time, everyone faces the
risk of a pretextual stop. But while Whren certainly makes it possiblefor
the police to stop anyone, the fact is that police will not stop just anyone. In fact, police will use the immense discretionary power Wkren
gives them mostly to stop African-Americans and Hispanics. I say this
not to imply that individual officers will act out of racist motivations.
Though some will, I believe most will not. Rather, my point is that
whatever their motivation, viewed as a whole, pretextual stops will be
used against African-Americans and Hispanics in percentages wildly
out of proportion to their numbers in the driving population.
It may seem bold that I make this assertion as a fact. In fact, I
lack the kind of systematically gathered and analyzed data anyone
making such a statement would prefer to have. This is because virtually no one-no individual, no police department, and no other government agency-has ever kept comprehensive statistics on who
police stop: basis for the stop, race of suspect, type of police activity
after stop (e.g., questioning, search of suspect, search of car, use of
drug-sniffing dog, whether consent was given), and the like. Of
course, one type of record does follow some percentage of stops: traffic tickets and warnings, and arrest, charging and prosecution records
of those suspects police find with contraband. But looking only at the
records of those charged and prosecuted can mislead, and says nothing about the many other stops that result in no ticket and yield no
contraband.
Even so, information uncovered in the last few years has begun to
shed light on the use of pretextual traffic stops. This data reveals several patterns, which African-Americans and Hispanics understand
quite well already: police use traffic regulations to investigate many
innocent citizens; these investigations, which are often quite intrusive,
concern drugs, not traffic; and African-Americans and Hispanics are
the targets of choice for law enforcement. So even if we lack systemic
data, we now have something that gives us a strong indication of current law enforcement realities and the direction of future trends. We
can comfortably predict the effect of Whren: police will use the case to
justify and expand drug interdiction efforts against people of color.
Here are four different stories of pretextual stops. They originate
from different areas of the country: Florida in the South, Maryland in
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the Northeast, Illinois in the Midwest, and Colorado in the West. All
involve independent police agencies. Other stories of this type of police activity exist, 89 but those presented here are among the best documented. Each of them teaches the same lesson. And with Whren on
the books, we should expect more of what these stories tell, not less.
A.

VOLUSIA COUNTY, FLORIDA

Located in central Florida, Volusia County surrounds a busy
stretch of Interstate 95. In the late 1980's, this portion of highway
became the focus of Sheriff Bob Vogel and his deputies. Using a
group of officers called the Selective Enforcement Team, Vogel operated a major drug interdiction effort against drivers moving narcotics
by car through his jurisdiction. 90 The deputies aimed not only to
make arrests, but to make seizures of cash and vehicles, which their
agency would keep. 9 1
As with most police agencies, the Volusia County Sheriffs Department did not keep records of stops and searches in which no arrests
or seizures occurred in the three years that the Selective Enforcement
Team operated. 92 Thus no one might ever have learned about the
Selective Enforcement Team's practices, except for one thing: Volusia
County deputies' were cars fitted with video cameras. 9 Deputies
taped some of the 1-95 stops; using Florida's public records law, The
Orlando Sentinel obtained 148 hours of the videotapes. 94 Deputies
made no tapes for much of the duration of the interdiction effort, and
they sometimes taped over previously recorded stops. 95 But the tapes
the newspaper obtained documented almost 1,100 stops, and they
showed a number of undeniable patterns.
First, even though African-Americans and Hispanics make up
96
only about five percent of the drivers on the county's stretch of 1-95,
89 E.g., Duke Helfand & Susan Steinberg, Chages of Police Racism Tear at Beverly Hills'

Image, L.A. Tmses, December 27, 1995, at Al (African-Americans "go out of their way to
avoid Beverly Hills for fear of being stopped by police" and six have filed suit as a result of
stops); Barbara White Stack, The Color of Justice: The Race Question, PrTISBURGH POST-GAzu-rE, May 5, 1996, atAl (common experience of police harassment has led some AfricanAmericans to file suit).
90 Henry Pierson Curtis, Statisti Show Pattern of Discrimination,ORLANDO SEmaNEL, Au-

gust 23, 1992, at All.
91 Id.; Jeff Brazil and Steve Berry, Color of Driver is Key to Stops in 1-95 Videos, ORLANDO
SEN'TNEL, August 28, 1992, at Al.
92 Id.

93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Curtis, supra note 90, at All (during five days of sampling, "about 5 percent of the
drivers of 1,120 vehicles counted were dark skinned").
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more than seventy percent of all drivers stopped were either AfricanAmerican or Hispanic. 9 7 The tapes put this in stark terms. One African-American man said he was stopped seven times by police; another
said that he was stopped twice within minutes. Looking at figures for
all of Florida, seventy percent is vastly out of proportion to the percentage of Blacks among Floridians of driving age (11.7 percent), the
percentage of Blacks among all Florida drivers convicted of traffic offenses in 1991 (15.1 percent), or to the percentage of Blacks in the
nation's population as a whole (12 percent). 98 (Hispanics make up
about nine percent of the population)99 Second, the deputies not
only stopped black and Hispanic drivers more often than whites; they
also stopped them for longer periods of time. According to the videotapes, deputies detained Blacks and Hispanics for twice as long as they
detained whites.' 00 Third, the tapes showed that police followed a
stop with a search roughly half the time; eighty percent of the cars
searched belonged to Black or Hispanic drivers.' 0 '
It should not surprise anyone to know that deputies said they
made these 1,100 stops based on "legitimate traffic violations." 02 Violations ranged from "swerving" (243), to exceeding the speed limit by
up to ten miles per hour (128), burned-out license tag lights (71),
improper license tags (46), failure to signal before a lane change (45),
to a smattering of others. 10 3 Even so, only nine of the nearly eleven
hundred drivers stopped-considerably less than one percent-received tickets, 04 and deputies even released several drivers who admitted to crimes, including drunk driving, without any charges.' 0 5
The tapes also showed that the seizure of cash remained an important
goal of the stops, with deputies seizing money almost three times as
often as they arrested anyone for drugs.' 0 6 With regard to the seizures
97 Id.; Brazil and Berry, supra note 91, at Al ("Almost 70 percent of the motorists

stopped were black or Hispanic, an enormously disproportionate figure because the vast
majority of interstate drivers are white.").
98 Curtis, supra note 90, at All.
99 Id.
100 Brazil

& Berry, supra note 91, at Al (Average length of stop in minutes: minority
drivers, 12.1, white drivers, 5.1).
101 Id. atAl (in 507 searches shown by the tapes, four out of five were of cars with Black
or Hispanic drivers; note, however, that these numbers do "not include 78 possible
searches/incomplete video").
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.

Even in these stops, race sometimes played a role. When a stopped white driver
told a deputy he was not doing well, the deputy replied, "could be worse, could be black."
Id.
106 Id. (89 seizures of cash and 31 drug arrest, respectively). Note also that almost 87
percent of stops were in the southbound lanes, "where any drug traffickers would more
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of cash, race also played a role: Ninety percent of the drivers from
whom cash was taken, but who were not arrested, were Black or
10 7
Hispanic.
Notwithstanding these numbers, Sheriff Vogel said there was no
racial bias in his department's work. Prior to the release of the tapes,
he stated that the stops were not based on skin color and that deputies
stopped "a broad spectrum of people."1 08 The tapes eventually led to
two lawsuits in federal court in which plaintiffs alleged violations of
their civil rights because they were targeted for stops on the basis of
their race.10 9 In both cases, a judge refused to certify a class of all
minority citizens illegally stopped; this resulted in the dismissal of the
cases when they went to trial.110 On appeal, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissals.1 '
The experience of drivers in Volusia County shows what we can
expect under Whren. Police will use traffic regulations as an excuse to
stop drivers they suspect of narcotics trafficking, and most of those
stopped will be people of color. Of course, this is exactly the type of
police activity that African-Americans and Hispanics have complained
of for years, but few have listened.
B.

1 12

ROBERT WILKINS AND THE MARYLAND STATE POLICE

In the early morning hours of May 8, 1992, a Maryland State Police officer stopped a new rental car carrying four African-Americans
on Interstate 68. The four, all relatives, were returning to the Washington, D.C. area from a family member's funeral in Chicago." 3 After
likely be carrying cash to Miami," and "[o]nly 13 percent of stops were in the northbound
lanes, where the catch would more likely be drugs." Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Steve Berry, DrugSquad's 1-95 Tactics Going On Tria, ORLANOO S.NrNEL, Jan 6, 1995,
at Al; 1-95 Cash-Seizure Stops, ORLANDO SstrlNE, June 10, 1995, at D3 (first case denied

class action status).
110 Washington v. Vogel, 880 F. Supp. 1542 (M.D. Fla. 1995); Steve Berry, judge Throws

Out Suit Against Vogel; ORLANDO SENTrNEL, Jan. 14, 1995, at Al (cases dismissed because

"plaintiff had not produced enough evidence to show that Vogel had used illegal tactics,"
but did not address "whether Vogel had a policy of targeting minority motorists"); Steve
Berry, Bob Vogel Brees Through Minorities' Legal Challenge, ORLANDO SENTINEL, January 15,

1995, at Al (first case dismissed at trial because judge refused to certify a class).
II1 Washington v. Vogel, Nos. 95-2190, 95-3123, slip op. at 7 (11th Cir. Jan. 7, 1997)
("[The plaintiff's] evidence of a race-based policy, while highly disturbing, fails to demonstrate that the policy, and not traffic violations, prompted the individual officers in this
case to conduct [plaintiff's] traffice stops.").
112 The facts described here are taken from the Complaint in the lawsuit Mr. Wilkins
and others filed after the incident. See Complaint, Wilkins v. Maryland State Police et al.,
Civil No. MJG-93-468, (D. Md. 1993) [hereinafter Complaint].
113 Id.
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obtaining the driver's license, the officer asked the driver to step out
of the car and sign a form giving consent to a search." 4 At that point,
Robert Wilkins, one of the passengers in the car, identified himself as
an attorney with a 9:30 a.m. court appearance in the District of Columbia Superior Court. Wilkins told the officer that he had no right
to search the car without arresting the driver; the officer replied that
such searches were "routine." After all, the officer said, if Wilkins and
his relatives had "nothing to hide, then what [was] the problem?"" 5
Another officer joined the first, and they detained the group for an
additional half hour while other officers brought a drug-sniffing dog
to the scene." 6 The driver asked whether he would receive a ticket;
the officer said he would only give the driver a warning. The driver
asked that the warning be written so that the group could leave, and
Wilkins asserted that continued detention in order to bring the dog
violated the Constitution; the officer ignored both of them." 7 When
the dog arrived, the officers ordered Wilkins and his relatives out of
the car, despite their expressed fears of the dog and the fact that it was
raining. 118 They were forced to stand in the rain as the dog sniffed in
and around the car." 9 When the dog failed to react in any way, Wilkins and the others were then allowed back in the car-while the officer who had stopped them wrote the driver a $105 speeding
20
ticket.'
Civil rights lawyers sometimes say that despite the volume of complaints they receive about racially biased traffic stops, victims of this
treatment feel reluctant to become plaintiffs in legal actions for redress. 121 Perhaps they fear retaliation; others may want to avoid the
hassle of becoming involved in a very public way in complex and often
politically charged litigation. Still others may fear that opposing lawyers may discover dirt in their pasts and use it against them. Not so
with Robert Wilkins. A Harvard Law School graduate, Wilkins worked
as a public defender for the highly-regarded Public Defender Service
in Washington, D.C.' 22 As an attorney with an active practice in criminal law, he was no doubt thoroughly familiar with the law that govId. 1 19.
1[ 20.
116 Id. [ 22.
117 Id. 1 23.
114

115 Id.

118 Id.

24-25.

119 Id. [ 26.
120 Id. 26-27.
121 Mark Pazniokas, Discriminationby Police Often Hard to Prove, HARTFoRW CouRATarr, May
2, 1994, at All ("[V]ictims [of racially biased police practices] are reluctant to sue" and

"shrug off the [racially biased] stops as an annoying fact of life.")
122 Complaint, Wid/ins, at 1 20 (Civ. No. MJC,-93-468).
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erned the situation in which he and his family members found
themselves. 123 The prospect of public litigation against a police
agency obviously did not scare him. Individually and on behalf of a
class of all others treated similarly, he and his family members sued
the Maryland State Police, supervisory and command personnel at the
agency, and the individual officers involved. They alleged civil rights
violations and other wrongs, stating that the officers had illegally
stopped and detained them on the basis of a "profile" that targeted
people based on their race. 124 State Police officials denied Wilkins'
allegations; a spokesman said the practice of stopping a disproportionate number of blacks simply represented "an unfortunate byproduct
of sound police policies." 125 The implication was clear: African-Americans commit the most crime; to stop crime, we must stop AfricanAmericans. Officials maintained this supposedly race-neutral explanation even in the face of an official document that surfaced during
litigation. Datedjust days before the State Police officers stopped Wilkins and his family members, it warned officers operating in Allegheny County-the very county in which police stopped the Wilkins
group-to watch for "dealers and couriers (traffickers) [who] are
predominantly black males and black females .... utilizing Interstate
68 . . ."'126
The case eventually produced a settlement, in which the Maryland State Police agreed not to use any race-based drug courier
profiles and to cease using "race as a factor for the development of
policies for stopping, detaining, and searching motorists." 1 2 7 The

State Police also agreed to conduct training that would reflect the prohibition on the use of race as both departmental policy and state
law,' 28 and to pay monetary damages and attorney's fees.' 29 Perhaps
more significantly, the State Police agreed that for a period of three
years, they would:
maintain computer records of all stops in which a consent to search was
given by a motorist stopped on any Maryland roadway by the Maryland
State Police and all stops on any Maryland roadway by Maryland State
Police in which a search by a drug-detecting dog is made, "minimally
123 As recited in the Complaint, Wilkins demostrated his familiarity with the law. Id. [
20.
124 Id. 11 21, 37-57.
125 Fletcher, supra note 10, at Al.
126 Maryland State Police, Criminal Intelligence Report (April 27, 1992) (on file with
author).
127 Settlement Agreement, Wilkins v. Maryland State Police, Civ. No. MJG-93-468 (D.
Md.), Jan. 5, 1995, at J[ 6 [hereinafter Settlement Agreement].
128 Id. 1 7, 8. Both of these paragraphs reference Derricottv. State, 611 A.2d 592 (Md.
1992), which outlaws the use of racial profiles in Maryland.
129 Settlement Agreement, supra note 127, at ' 13, 14.
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including in such records: date, time, and location of consent or search,
name of officer(s) requesting consent to search or directing search by
drug dog; race of persons(s) stopped, detained, or searched; year make
and model of vehicle; and grounds for requesting
that consent to search
8 0
be given or search by drug dog made, if any.",'

The State Police have, in fact, maintained these records, and submitted them to the court. The latest figures available track stops followed

by consent searches and dog sniffs from January 1995 through June
1996, and they bear a striking similarity to the information revealed by
the Volusia County videotapes. Of the 732 citizens detained and
searched by the Maryland State Police, 75% were African-Americans,
and 5% were Hispanics.' 3 ' The Maryland numbers are also broken

down by officer; of the twelve officers involved, six stopped over 80%
African-Americans, one stopped over 95% African-Americans, and two
stopped only African-Americans. 3 2 Based on this information, provided to the court by the State Police, the plaintiffs and their attorneys
are preparing to reopen the litigation, as the Settlement Agreement
allows.18 8 Sad to say, the numbers show that very little has changed,
34
despite the Wilkins suit and the Settlement Agreement.
C.

PESO CHAVEZ AND THE ILLINOIS STATE POLICE

During recent years, African-Americans and Hispanics have made
hundreds of complaints to the Illinois affiliate of the American Civil
Liberties Union, alleging that the Illinois State Police targeted them
for pretextual traffic stops.'8 5 The A.C.L.U. eventually filed suit; a
130 Id. 1 9. Note that such records might tend to underestimate the total number of
racially biased stops on the highways, because they only include stops that are followed by
searches, and only two kinds of searches at that: searches by consent and searches with
dogs. As the Volusia County data indicates, there are often significant numbers of citizens
stopped who are not searched. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
131 Summaries of records of Maryland State Police searches, January 1995 through June
1996 [on file with the author]. These data were provided to the court and plaintiff's counsel in raw form; the summaries on file with the author were produced by the plaintiff's
legal team.
132 Id.
133 Settlement Agreement, supra note 127, at 1 10. See also Plaintiff's Motion for Enforcement of Settlement Agreement and Further Relief, Wilkins v. Maryland State Police,
Civ. No. CCB-93-468 (D. Md. Nov. 4, 1996).
134 Thus it was not surprising to find that the continuation of these practices by the
Maryland State Police has led to the filing of yet another,separate lawsuit. Michael Schneider, State Police 1-95 Drug Unit Found to Search Black Motorists 4 Times More Often than hifte
BALTIMORE SUN, May 23, 1996 (detailing the "deeply humiliating" roadside search of the
vehicle and possessions of Charles and Etta Carter who were travelling on the occasion of
their 40th wedding anniversary).
185 Andrew Fegelman, Suit ChargesState PoliceImproperly Stop Minorities,CH. TiuB., August
31, 1994, at 4 (Chavez's suit "echo[ed] complaints the organization has received from motorists for six years"); Illegal Searches Used in Illinois, Suit Alleges, N.Y. TMES, Sept. 4, 1994, at
24 (suit filed after "hundreds of complaints from motorists") (hereinafter Illegal Searches);
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man named Peso Chavez became the lead plaintiff. However, Mr.
Chavez's 1994 encounter with the Illinois State Police did not happen
by chance.
Chavez was a private investigator with twenty years of experience
and a former elected official in Santa Fe, New Mexico. In 1994, a
lawyer for an Hispanic man who alleged that Illinois State Police had
stopped him illegally hired Chavez to drive a late model sedan across
areas of Illinois that had been the source of complaints of illegal stops
and searches of minority motorists.'8 6 The plan called for Chavez, a
man with an Hispanic appearance, to drive cautiously, taking care not
to break the traffic laws; a paralegal in another car would follow at a
distance to observe his driving. The idea was a "reverse sting"' 3 7 -an
attempt to catch police in the act of making illegal stops and searches.
On February 18, 1993, in Bureau County, Illinois, Officer
Thomas of the Illinois State Police began to follow Chavez. He followed Chavez for twenty miles, through Bureau and LaSalle- Counties.' 38 Eventually, Thomas activated his emergency lights and pulled
Chavez over.' 3 9 Thomas was soon joined at the scene by another officer. Officer Thomas told Chavez that he had stopped him for a traffic violation, and asked Chavez for his license and rental agreement.
Chavez supplied both. 14 After questioning Chavez, Thomas gave
Chavez a warning for failing to signal when changing lanes. This supposed infraction was an obvious and unfounded pretext for the stop;
the paralegal following Chavez saw no such violation. 14 1 The other
officer then asked Chavez if he could search his car. Chavez asked
whether he had to allow the search; the officer said that he wanted a
drug-sniffing dog to walk around Chavez' car. Chavez unequivocally
refused and asked to be allowed to leave, but the officers detained
him.142 Another officer then led a dog around Chavez' car; the officers told Chavez that the dog had "alerted" to the presence of narcotics, and ordered him into the back seat of a patrol car. 143 For the
next hour, Chavez watched as the interior, trunk, and engine compartment of his car were thoroughly searched. The police opened his
Profiles in Pr judie ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, September 19, 1994, at 6B.
1S6 Illegal Searches, supranote 135, at 24.
137 Illiis DrugSearchesPromptLawsuit ByACLU, ORLANDO SENTrNEL, September 1, 1994,

at A12.
138 Fourth Amended Complaint, Chavez v. Illinois State Police, Civil No. 94 C 5307
(N.D. Ill.
1994), at 11 23, 24 (on file with author).
'39 Id. 25.
140 Id. 1 26.
141 Id. 1 22; Sam Vincent Meddis, Suit Says Suspect T'rofiles'AreRacist, USA TODAY, Sep-

tember 1, 1994, at 3A.
142 Fourth Amended Complaint, Chave, at [ 29.
143 Id. 11[
30, 31.
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luggage and searched through his personal possessions. 144 Meanwhile, an officer in the patrol car with Chavez questioned him about
his personal life. 145 The police found nothing, and eventually allowed
Chavez to leave. 146
Despite his background as an investigator, his government experience, and the knowledge that he was part of a reverse sting, Chavez
found the experience more than unnerving. Watching police search
his car and being told that the dog had detected drugs, Chavez said, "I
became very frightened at what was happening. I never had my
mouth as dry as it was-it was like cotton." 14 7
Chavez is now the named plaintiff in a lawsuit in federal court
that seeks injunctive relief against the State Police to stop racially
based searches and seizures, as well as other relief and damages. The
suit seeks certification of a class of persons subjected to the same treatment. Many other African-Americans and Hispanics who were sub148
jected to illegal stops and searches have become named plaintiffs.
14 9
At this writing, discovery is ongoing.
D.

EAGLE COUNTY, COLORADO

In the late 1980's, the Eagle County, Colorado Sheriff's Department established a highway drug interdiction unit. The "High Country Drug Task Force" used a drug courier profile made up of twentytwo "indicators" to stop cars along Interstate 70; prominent among
them was "race or ethnicity, based on 'intelligence information' from
-150 Although the Task Force used traffic inother law agencies ..
fractions as a pretext to stop many people, not one person received a
ticket.15 '
The story of one of the people stopped speaks volumes about
what happened in Eagle County. On May 3, 1989, Eagle County deputies stoppedJhenita Whitfield as she drove from San Diego to Denver
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.

11 2, 33.
11

33.

Meddis, supra note 141, at 3A.
Fourth Amended Complaint, Chavez, at 1[ 39-129. Many of these plaintiffs were
stopped by the Illinois State Police more than once.
149 Telephone interview with Fred Tsao, Public Information Director of the American
Civil Liberties Union, Chicago, Ill. (July 23, 1996).
150 Patrick O'DriscoIl, DrugProfile'Lawsuit Settled, DENVER PosT, November 10, 1995, at
Al.
151 Robert Jackson, Minorities Win Suit Over Unfair 1-70 Stops, RocKY MOUNTAIN NEws,
November 10, 1995, at 4A ("Of the 402 people stopped between August 1988 and August
1990 on 1-70 between Eagle and Glenwood Springs, none was ticketed or arrested for
147
148

drugs....

").
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to visit relatives. With her were her sister and their four children. 152
A disabled vehicle in the roadway forced them to change lanes; soon
after, an officer pulled them over for failing to signal before changing
lanes. 153 The deputies told her explicitly that she "'fit the profile' of a
54
possible drug runner," and asked if they could search her car.'
Whitfield wanted to refuse, but felt concerned that if she did, she
might be "set up."155 She also felt she had no choice because the children were hungry and one needed to use a bathroom, so she consented. 156 The experience left Whitfield, an African-American,
shaken, and it has changed her life in a significant way. Despite the
fact that she has family out of town, she does not visit them. "I do not
157
travel anymore," she said.
Seven people who, like Jhenita Whitfield, had been stopped by
Eagle County deputies filed a class action suit in 1990, asking the
court to halt the Task Force's practice of race-based profile stops. 158
The court eventually certified a class consisting of 400 individuals who
had been stopped.' 5 9 Among them were African-Americans and a
large number of Hispanics, who alleged that deputies stopped them
because of their ethnicity. 16 0 In November of 1993, a federal court
ruled that the Task Force had violated constitutional protections
against unreasonable searches and seizures. With appeals pending,
the parties reached a settlement requiring Eagle County to pay damages to each person searched, amounting to a total of $800,000. The
County also agreed to abandon the Task Force program, and agreed
not to stop, search, seize evidence or detain a person "unless there is
some objective reasonable suspicion that the person has done some16 1
thing wrong."
E.

LIVING WITH PRETEXTUAL STOPS

These cases from Florida, Maryland, Illinois and Colorado show
in no uncertain terms the impact Whren will have: The drivers police
will stop for pretextual traffic violations will come from minority
152
155
154
155

O'Driscoll, supra note 150, at Al.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Jackson, supra note 151, at 4A.
157 O'Driscoll, supra note 150, at Al.
158 Id. For a criminal case in which a suppression motion grew out of the Eagle County
deputies' use of pretextual stops, see United States v. Laymon, 730 F. Supp. 332 (D. Colo.
1990), finding that an Eagle County deputy had used a traffic stop as a pretext, and that
the consent that followed the stop was not valid.
159 O'Driscoll, supra note 150, at Al
160 Id.
161 Jackson, supra note 151, at 4A
156
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groups in disproportionate numbers. Police have done it in the recent past; in the Maryland case, police continue to do so despite a
settlement reflected in a court order specifically prohibiting these
practices. Whren insulates this activity by pronouncing any stop for a
traffic violation proper and reasonable, whatever its real purpose.
But seeing the big picture should not prevent us from asking
what effect pretextual stops have on the individuals who experience
them. The answer highlights the hidden cost of racially skewed law
enforcement techniques in a profound way.
For those stopped, the situation may produce fear, anger, humiliation, and even rage. Jhenita Whitfield, the African-American woman
stopped in Eagle County, has given up travelling because she once
had to balance her desire not to submit to a search against her fear
162
that not consenting would lead the police to plant evidence on her.
Peso Chavez, the experienced investigator stopped while driving
through Illinois, knew he had no narcotics with him, knew he had a
witness to prove that he had broken no laws, and knew and insisted
upon his rights. Still, his mouth went dry with fear as officers reported
that a dog had been alerted to drugs in his car and the officers proceeded to search through the car and his private effects. 163 Robert
Wilkins and his family members, forced to stand in the rain while a
dog sniffed through their car, felt degraded. "You can't imagine the
anger and humiliation I felt during the entire episode," said Aquila
Abdullah, a passenger in the car with Wilkins that night.'6 Wilkins
himself expressed a sense of helplessness. "Part of me feels like there
is nothing that I could have done to prevent what happened. You
know, I was calm and respectful to the police. I tried to explain to the
officer what my rights are." 165 Beyond the price paid by the person
stopped, other African-Americans and Hispanics feel the effects, too.
Because these pretextual police stops of blacks are so common-frequent enough to earn the name "driving while black"-many AfricanAmericans regularly modify the most casual aspects of their driving
behavior, travel itineraries, and even their personal appearance, to
avoid police contact. Salim Muwakkil, an academic and journalist,
makes trips in the Midwest in a nondescript rental car, strictly obeys
the speed limit, and never wears his beret behind the wheel. 166
Before he adopted this strategy, police stopped Muwakkil so often that
162
163
164

See O'Driscoll supra note 150, at Al.
See Meddis, sura note 141, at 3A.
ACLU Sues Maryland Police, LouisviLLE CoumR-JouRNAL, February 14, 1993, at 20A.

165
166

Fletcher, supra note 10, at Al.
Id.
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he would compute the time these stops took into his travel time.' 67
When lawyer and lobbyist Wade Henderson drives from Washington,
D.C., to Richmond, Virginia, to teach, he eschews flashy rental cars for
16
conservative ones, even though he is graying and wears a suit.
Others restrict their movements; they avoid driving in areas where a
black person attracts "stares." 169 And when police stop Christopher
Darden, one of the prosecutors in the OJ. Simpson case, he doesn't
move, keeps his hands on the wheel, and makes no sudden gestures;
70
he calls these "African American survival techniques."'
But perhaps we should examine the issue from another perspective: that of law enforcement. 17' And that outlook would. no doubt
seem quite different from what I have said so far. In a nutshell, it is
this: Stopping a disproportionate number of African-Americans is not
racist; it is just plain good police work. After all, African-Americans
make up a large share of those arrested, prosecuted and jailed in this
country. Police know jails are full of criminals, a substantial portion of
whom are black, and that a high percentage of black males are under
72
the control of the criminal justice system in one way or another.
The police have no interest in harassing black or Hispanic people;
rather, their motivation remains the apprehension of criminals. Race
may play a part in law enforcement, but only as a proxy for a higher
probability of criminal activity. In other words, racial disparities in
stops and searches are nothing more than "an unfortunate byproduct
of sound police policies." 173 Lt. Col. Ernest Leatherbury, commander
of field operations for the Maryland State Police, puts it this way:
"The facts speak for themselves... [W]hen you got a high number of
these consent searches resulting in drug arrests do we in law enforcement or the public want to say the state police should discontinue
these searches?" 74 In other words, police target blacks and Hispanics
because they are the right ones, and this technique gets results. And
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.

170 Id.
171 Indeed, I would be remiss if I did not look to the position of law enforcement, given

the Supreme Court's pronouncements on the right way for lower courts to make judgments on whether or not officers had reasonable suspicion or probable cause. See United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) ("[T]he evidence thus collected must be seen
and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed.
in the field of law enforcement.").
172 MARc MAUER & TRAcv HUuNO, YOUNG BLACK AMERICANS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SySERM: FmvE YEAPs LAER 3 (1995) ("Almost one in three (32.2% of black men in the age
group 20-29) is under criminal justice supervision on any given day-in prison or jail, on
probation or parole.").
173 Fletcher, supra note 10, at Al.
174 Id.
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if it works, we should not let the niceties of search and seizure law get
in the way of catching the bad guys.
But this argument contains a flaw, and it is not a small one. Behind the race-neutral reasons police give lies a stark truth. When officers stop disproportionate members of African-Americans because
this is "just good police work," they are using race as a proxy for the
criminality or "general criminal propensity" of an entire racial
group. 175 Simply put, police are targeting all African-Americans because some are criminals. In essence, this thinking predicts that all
blacks, as a group, share a general propensity to commit crimes.
Therefore, having black skin becomes enough-perhaps along with a
minimal number of other factors, perhaps alone-for law enforcement to stop and detain someone. Under this view, all black citizens
become probable criminals-suspects the minute they venture out of
their homes.
The wrongheadedness and unfairness of treating all members of
a group as criminals just because some are seems obvious. But even if
not everyone feels this way, treating race as a proxy for criminality
suffers from other serious problems. First, implicit in this view is the
assumption that blacks are disproportionately more likely than whites
and others to be involved with street crimes.1 76 Even if this is true,
African-Americans being more likely than whites to be involved in
street crime is a far cry from any evidence that would strongly support
the assertion that any particularblack person is committing a crime.
Yet that is the way police use this information. Second, even if we
accept the assumption of the disproportionate involvement of blacks
in street crime, police still greatly overestimate the value of race as a
predictor of criminal behavior. 177 Using race as a proxy for criminality may result in "double counting." 178 If, for example, criminal involvement is strongly correlated with poverty, with presence in socalled "high crime areas," or with both, and if African-Americans are
disproportionately poor and living in such neighborhoods, 79 race
would add little to a police officer's ability to predict criminal involve175 Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L J. 214, 220,

236-237, 237-39 (1983) (police use minority race as a proxy for a greater probability of
criminal involvement, even though, statistically and logically, this is problematic at best).
176 ProfessorJohnson makes this assumption, but is careful to say that if so-called "white
collar crime" were counted, the numbers might look very different. Id. at 237.
177 Id. at 237-39.

178 Id. at 238-39.
179 See, e.g., David A. Harris, Factorsfor Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and PoorMeans

Stopped and Frisked,69 NIN. L.J. 659, 677-678 (1994) (noting that segregation of urban areas
usually means that minority group members often live and work in "high crime areas").
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ment beyond what poverty and geography already reveal.' s0 As Professor Sheri Lynn Johnson has said, "(a)lthough probabilistic
constraints may not preclude general racial propensities to commit
crime, they clearly militate against according them substantial
1
weight.'U8
V. WHAT HAPPENS AFMR THE STOP?

Once police stop a person for a traffic offense, what happens? By
posing this question, I do not mean to imply that the stop itself is
insignificant. On the contrary, the stop is itself not only unnerving
but potentially dangerous, especially if it is ordered by an officer in
plain clothes or in an unmarked car.' 8 2 Although pretextual traffic
stops may be problematic in themselves, they are also disturbing because they may lead to searches. What rules govern what happens after
a pretextual stop?
First, if police have probable cause to stop a vehicle, this alone
does not entitle them to search it. There must be something more
than the traffic offense to justify a search, some combination of facts
that gives police probable cause to believe that an offense has been or
is being committed or that the vehicle contains contraband. While we
can argue whether any particular set of facts actually gives rise to probable cause or reasonable suspicion, the bottom line is that something is
required to justify a search.' 8 3
There are several variations on this theme. If police arrest the
driver, they may search not only the driver but the interior of the car,
closed parts of the interior like the glove box, and any closed containers inside the interior. 8 4 And if the police see evidence of crime in
180 Johnson, supra note 175, at 238-39. Perhaps another way of looking at this, instead of
"double counting," is that race becomes a proxy for poverty and presence in a high crime
area, a view which makes little more sense than the one articulated in the text.
181 Id. In fact one commentator has gone even further, arguing that using race as a
proxy for criminality "results from a self-fulfilling statistical prophecy: racial stereotypes
influence police to arrest minorities more frequently than nonminorities, thereby generating statistically disparate arrest patterns that in turn form the basis for further selectivity."
Developments in the Law-Race and the Cfiminal.Process, 101 HARv. L REv. 1472, 1507-08
(1988). This argument involves some major assumptions, not the least of which is that
because blacks are disproportionately arrested and incarcerated, we can assume that a disproportionate number are being stopped. I do not think it is necessary to my argument to
go this far.
182 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
183 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (reasonable suspicion requires more than officer's "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,' [rather, it requires] the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his
experience")
184 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). Note that Belton does not allow the police
to search the trunk of the car, but once an arrest is made, the trunk might be opened and
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plain view, of course, they may seize it and then arrest and search as
appropriate. This, in fact, is what happened in Whren: Police stopped
the vehicle, and upon looking inside-without any further searching-saw two bags of cocaine.' 8 5
But in the great bulk of cases, there is no offense other than the
traffic violation, no arrest occurs for the traffic offense, and police
find nothing incriminating in plain view. Instead, police accomplish
their goal of searching those they stop in two other ways.
The first is simple: officers ask the people they stop to consent to
a search. While those asked need not consent, many do. The reasons
for this seem as varied as human beings are, but several causes
predominate. People simply may not know that they can refuse, and
the Constitution does not require the police to tell citizens that they
can withhold their consent.'8 6 Consequently, some undoubtedly feel
they have no choice. Others surely feel intimidated, as Jhenita Whitfield said she did in Eagle County. Intimidation was no doubt what
the Maryland State Police officer intended when he told Robert Wilkins that searches were "routine" and that if he had nothing to hide,
he should permit the search-leaving in the air the obvious implica87
tion that a refusal would show Wilkins' guilt.'
But the predominant reason drivers consent lies with police officers. Their goal, plain and simple, is to get people to agree to a
search. They are accomplished at the verbal judo necessary to subjugate their "opponents," they have the authority of their office behind
them, and they make it their business to get what they want. The officer starts with innocuous sounding questions: Where are you coming
from? Where are you headed? Who's the person you're visiting?
What's her address? Who's with you in the back seat? Then the questions often get more personal. They are designed to find contradictions that show the driver might have something to hide, and to put
the driver in the frame of mind of responding to the officer's authority. Police call it "sweet talk," and it almost always leads to a consensual search. None of this is accidental; rather, it is a well-honed,
calculated psychological technique that police departments teach
their officers.' 88 And it works. In the course of 150 stops over two
searched under proper inventory procedures, Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371-72
(1987), or if a drug sniffing dog alerts to the presence of narcotics in the trunk.
185 Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996).
186 Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417, 421 (1996) (Fourth Amendment does not require
lawfully seized suspects to be told they are free to leave before suspect's consent to search is
considered voluntary).
187 Kate Shatzkin & Joe Hallinan, Highway DragnetsSeek Drug Couriers-PoliceStop Many
Cars ForSearches, SEATLE TIMS, Sept. 3, 1992, at B6.
188 Id. ("'We definitely tell [our officers] to try to talk their way into a search,' said Lt.
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years, one Indiana state trooper said, "I've never had anyone tell me I
couldn't search."1 8 9
But what if the occupants of the car refuse? Must the police allow
them to leave, ending the encounter? Not necessarliy, as the Wilkins
case and others show. If police encounter a person like Wilkins-one
who knows he does not have to answer questions or consent to a
search, one who will insist on his rights-they use another technique:

they use a dog trained to detect drugs. If the dog gives the signal that
it has smelled drugs, this provides the police with probable cause for a
full-blown search of the vehicle and its contents. According to United
States v. P/ace,19 0 the use of such a dog does not constitute a search for

purposes of the Fourth Amendment; therefore, use of the dog requires neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion. Place gives
the police just what they need if a driver refuses consent: a search for
which consent is not necessary, which may yield the justification they
need to do the very search the driver refused to allow.
There is one important wrinkle in this argument. Once the
driver refuses consent, the police must not hold her any longer unless
there is probable cause or reasonable suspicion to do so. Can the
police hold someone long enough to have a drug detecting dog
brought to the scene? The Supreme Court has not yet supplied a definitive answer, but analogous cases indicate that if the police have
reasonable suspicion to suspect someone of involvement in a crime,
they can detain the person for a "reasonable" period of time to allow
the dog to be brought. In Place, a passenger's luggage was held for
ninety minutes to allow for a dog to sniff it; the Court found this unreasonable, because the law enforcement officials had advance warning and could have gotten the dog there in much less time.' 91 And in
United States v. Sharpe,192 the Court found a twenty minute detention
reasonable, because the delay was caused by the suspect's flight.' 93
Mike Nagurny of the Pennsylvania State Police bureau of drug law enforcement.").
189 Id.
190 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
191 Id. at 706. But see State v. Dickey, 684 A.2d 92 (NJ. Super Ct. App. Div. 1996) (hourslong detention of motorist before dog sniff held constitutional).
192 470 U.S. 675 (1985).
193 In Sharpe, a DEA agent became suspicious of a Pontiac travelling in tandem with an
overloaded truck and camper. The agent stopped the Pontiac, but the truck continued on,
pursued by another officer. Once another officer arrived at the place where the Pontiac
had been stopped, the DEA officer went in pursuit of the truck, which had been stopped
and detained some miles up the road for about twenty minutes in anticipation of the
agent's arrival. The Supreme Court said that in assessing whether an investigatory stop is
too long, "we consider it appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a
means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during
which time it was necessary to detain the defendant." Id. at 686. Since the DEA agent
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How the Court will ultimately resolve this question is anyone's guess;
the most likely possibility is case by case discussion of what length of
detention is reasonable under the circumstances. But given the
Court's unbounded analysis of the Fourth Amendment implications
of the use of dogs, the argument over the reasonableness of the length
of detention will be the only argument any driver has left
VI.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Whren represents the Supreme Court's official approval for the
use of pretextual stops by police. Defendants may no longer argue
successfully that particular traffic stops were purely excuses to allow
investigation of other crimes about which there was neither probable
cause nor reasonable suspicion. 194 IfI am right, all motorists are now
fair game for police, and African-Americans and other people of color
will suffer the great bulk of this treatment. Where does all of this
leave us? Can anything be done to address these practices and the
disparate impact they seem almost certain to have?
If Wkren does nothing else, it takes courts out of the business of
supervising this type of police conduct. Now, police need not come
up with any rationale for stopping motorists save the easy and obvious
one: violation of the traffic code. 9 5 Given that the door of judicial
redress has closed, and that the Supreme Court's suggested equal protection remedy seems unlikely to bear any fruit, what other avenues
are open to help grapple with the police practices highlighted here?
Two modest suggestions follow.
A.

ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS

In a time when we continue to focus on courts to control police
discretion, another tool is often overlooked: Police department policy
and regulation. If unchecked discretion and racially biased traffic enforcement tactics infect a police agency's operations, written policies
and regulation could fill the vacuum created by the Supreme Court's
abdication of supervisory responsibility. Any time official discretion
exists, we must ask not only how to eliminate unnecessary discretion,
but also how to regulate and constrain the discretion that must exist as
acted "expeditiously" and the delay was attributable to the driver's own "evasive actions,"

the Court found the detention of twenty minutes entirely reasonable. Id. at 687-88.
194 Of course, given that there was a circuit split before Whren on the question of the
correct standard to review pretextual traffic stops, see supra note 27, Whren did not change

either the law or practice in some places.
195 Thus we can find at least one possible benefit of the decision, however else one feels

about it: police will no longer have to perjure themselves in order to make these stops
stand up in court. See supra note 17; Dershowitz, supra note 57.
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part of the system.' 96 Departmental regulations have the potential to
do both.
In the recent past, courts, especially the Supreme Court, played
the dominant rulemaking role for law enforcement at the level of constitutional enforcement. This has been especially true in the Fourth
Amendment area. This resulted from the fact that other agenciesthe legislative branch, executive agencies, and police departments
themselves-failed to take any significant role in regulation of police. 197 Courts in the post-Mapp era rushed to fill this void; in the
Fourth Amendment field, this has been done through adjudication of
search and seizure cases.
But, as Professor LaFave has said, this has begun to change. 19 8
Many police departments now put their practices down in written
form as official policies or guidelines. 99 And the fact that police
agencies themselves construct these self-regulatory systems has some
important advantages. First police rulemaking makes for better police
decisions, if only because it focuses the department on policy making
and on the implications to the community of the police practices being regulated.2 00 Second, rules reduce the influence of bias because
they make training more uniform, and because they guide and control discretion.2 0 1 Third, police-made rules are most likely to be followed and enforced by police.2 0 2 Last-but certainly not least-is the
fact that, in cases such as Whren, the Supreme Court has simply taken
the judiciary out of the equation. If there is no regulation at the
agency level, there may simply be no regulation at all.
One line of the Supreme Court's own cases suggests that the
practices highlighted in this essay might be successfully addressed
through police regulation. Beginning with South Dakota v. Opperman,20 3 the Court passed upon the reasonableness of searches done
pursuant to departmental inventory procedures. In Opperman,the police discovered marijuana in the glove compartment of a vehicle they
had towed to an impound lot before they inventoried the contents of
196 KENNETr

GuLp DAVIS, DiSCRmEONARYJuSTCE 51 (1969).

197 Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in CriminalCases,
45 N.Y.U. L REv. 785, 790 (1970).
198 Wayne R. LaFave, ControllingDiscretion by Administrative Regulations: The Use, Misuse,
and Nonuse of PoliceRules and Policiesin FourthAmendment Adjudication, 89 MICH. L. R-v. 442,

446 (1990) (police use of written policies as instruments to control discretion grew "immeasurably but [to] a noticeable degree" between 1965 and 1990).
199 Id.
200 Id. at 451 (citing Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendmen
MnN L Rrv. 849, 421 (1974)).
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
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the car. The Supreme Court found the inventory search reasonable,
perhaps because police performed the inventory "pursuant to standard police procedures." 20 4 In the most recent inventory case, Colorado v. Bertine,20 5 police discovered contraband in a backpack found in
the defendant's vehicle during an inventory search. In Betine, the
Court was much clearer in delineating the place of police rules and
rulemaking in search and seizure law: "reasonable police regulations
relating to inventory procedures administered in good faith satisfy the
Fourth Amendment, even though courts might as a matter of hindsight be able to devise equally reasonable rules requiring a different
procedure." 206 As Professor LaFave points out, to the extent that Opperman and Bertine encourage or require departments to make rules
for inventories, this is all to the good. Since, according to Bettine, an
inventory search may be reasonable without either probable cause or
a warrant, 20 7 standardized police procedures for inventories will limit
and channel police discretion and prevent arbitrary police action. 208
We should consider using the same approach to confine and regulate police discretion vis-a-vis the conduct of traffic stops. While
Whren allows the police to stop motorists any time an officer could
have done so, this need not be the rule within any given police depart204 Id. at 372. I say "perhaps" because while there is no majority opinion, the plurality
does say that "inventories pursuant to standard police procedures are reasonable," id., and
Justice Powell, concurring, also takes care to say that the inventory "was conducted strictly
in accord with the regulations of the Vermillion Police Department," under which all impounded vehicles are inventoried, including the glove compartment. Id. at 380 and n.6.
205 479 U.S. 367 (1987). Note that Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983), which came
between Opperman and Bertine, also dealt with an inventory search: a search of the contents
of the backpack of a person who had been arrested. Since it was "standard procedure" to
inventory all of an arrested person's possessions, id. at 642, the Court said that it was not
unreasonable "for police, as part of the routine procedure incident to incarcerating an
arrested person, to search any container or article in his possession, in accordance with
established inventory procedures." Id. at 648.
206 Bertine, 479 U.S. at 374.
207 Id. at 371.
208 LaFave, supra note 198, at 454. It is worth noting that the majority opinion in Be-rtine
treats the facts as if there were, in fact, regulations strictly governing inventory searches,
Bertine, 479 U.S. at 374 n.6, and that three of the seven justices signing the majority opinion
joined in a separate concurring opinion to say, explicitly, that inventory searches must
follow "standardized police procedures" that ensure an "absence of [police] discretion"
such that "it is permissible for police officers to open closed containers... only if they are
following standard police procedures that mandate the opening of such containers in
every impounded vehicle." IdRat 376-77 (Blackmun, J. concurring). But the dissenters
vehemently disagreed with the majority's characterization of the regulations at issue. In
fact, the regulations allowed the police a choice: upon the arrest of the driver, they could
give custody of the vehicle to a third party; the vehicle could be parked and locked in the
nearest public parking facility; or the vehicle could be impounded and its contents inventoried. Id. at 379-80. Thus the dissenters argued that "the record indicates that no standardized criteria limit [the] officer's discretion." Id. at 379 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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ment. In fact, it was not the rule in the District of Columbia, where
Whren arose; departmental regulations prohibited the making of traffic stops except within certain well-defined parameters. 2 09 Departments could make rules that set out criteria for situations in which
officers can stop cars when there is no intention of giving a traffic
citation or performing other enforcement activities related to operation of the vehicle. At the very least, departmental regulations could
prohibit the targeting of racial or ethnic groups for traffic stops and
searches. To encourage rulemaking (or review of existing rules)
along these lines, federal and state governments might offer incentives in the form of increased funding to those departments that make
changes in their existing regulations or implement new ones. Alternatively, of course, there might be financial penalties for departments
that do not comply, or some combination of carrot and stick.
B.

COLLECTION OF DATA ON TRAFFIC STOPS AND SEARCHES AND THE
RULES PUT IN PLACE TO GOVERN THEM

A second step we might take to address the problem of pretextual
stops involves the collection of data. Police departments could be required (or financially encouraged) to collect data on all traffic stops.
This data should include the reason for the stop, the race, ethnicity,
and other identifying information concerning the person stopped,
whether the driver received a citation or warning and for what,
whether a search followed the stop, the basis for the search (consent,
observation of incriminating items, or the like), whether a dog was
used as part of the procedure, whether contraband was found and if
so what kind, and whether any property was seized under forfeiture
laws.
The collection of this data would allow for large-scale study of
traffic stops and the issues they raise, and would allow for a more rigorous analysis than I have presented here. While the numbers of persons stopped in my examples are large-in Volusia County alone, for
example, the number of stops on the video tapes is almost eleven hundred-any social scientist would no doubt prefer a more systematic
collection of data. And even in the Maryland case, in which stops
must be recorded, the court did not order Maryland State Police to
collect all the information that might prove useful to someone studying these practices. On the contrary, only stops followed by consent
searches or searches with dogs are included, whereas a more complete
picture would, at the very least, require that all stops be tallied,
whether or not followed by a search. A widespread, standardized
209 See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
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study of a number of police departments in a wide variety of geographic areas would give us the opportunity to arrive at a better understanding. If the data show that, in fact, African-Americans or other
racial or ethnic groups are being targeted by police, 2 10 there would be
no dismissing their experiences as isolated incidents or the work of
just one or another particular police department. We might at last
have the information necessary to understand fully what happens in
these situations, and perhaps to finally persuade legislators and other
211
leaders that we must take concrete steps toward solutions.
Such data collection would also allow us to study the effectiveness
of the police regulations proposed above. Departments with and without such regulations could collect data, and the side by side comparison this would allow would give us a better understanding of the
effectiveness of this approach.
One can imagine at least two possible problems that might be
suggested concerning the collection of data on police/motorist encounters. First, individual police officers might be reluctant to report
information concerning their traffic stops. After all, would academics,
policy makers, and others not use the data to attempt to prove police
racism, either on the part of the individual or the institution? And
would this concern not result in either incomplete and perhaps stilted
reporting, or even reluctance to report at all, especially if the officer
could be seen to be acting in contravention of departmental regulations? While these concerns are understandable, they would not be
hard to address. Data collection could be anonymous, certainly as to
the activities of individual officers. And if part of what we wish to
study is whether departmental regulations might help limit or curb
objectionable elements of police discretion in this area, the identity of
the police department the data have come from might be hidden, too.
With anonymity safeguarding them from implicating themselves in
any way, there is no reason to believe that police and their superiors
would not fairly and fully report their traffic stop activities. As an example, recall that the Maryland State Police have been reporting all
210 To make a valid comparison, we would also need to know the relative frequency of
traffic violations by African-Americans vis-a-vis other groups. If this information is not already available, it should be easy to collect.
211 In fact, legislation has been introduced in the 105th Congress that would mandate
just such a study. Traffic Stops Statistics Act of 1997, H.I. 118, 105th ong. (1997). H.R.
18's sponsor is Representative John Conyers of Michigan. In its current form, the Act
would mandate collection of a number of categories of statistical information on drivers
stopped for traffic offenses, including race and ethnicity, the reason for the stop, and the
rationale for any search that follows a stop. It also obligates the Attorney General to publish an annual summary of the data acquired, and attempts to encourage full and complete
reporting by masking the identities of reporting officers and departments.
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stops resulting in canine and consent searches for many months now.
While they do this pursuant to a court order, there is still every reason
to believe that the Maryland State Police officers might feel reluctant
to report fully and accurately for just the reasons I have described. In
fact, their feelings might even be somewhat more intense, since the
data collected in Maryland is broken down officer by officer, with
names attached. Thus if one could imagine a scenario in which police
might fail to fully and fairly report their actions, the Maryland case
would be it. But that does not seem to be happening. While no one
but the individual officers involved knows for sure whether some stops
are not being reported, it would seem that underreporting would
skew the data away from any racial bias in stops, since all of the officers know that this was the problem from which the reporting obligation arose in the first place. Yet after eighteen months, the data show
that roughly eighty percent of the stops counted still involve people of
color. In other words, if the officers were trying to affect the numbers
(and one could argue that if anyone had incentive to do so, they do),
they are doing a poor job of it. The other explanation, of course, is
that they are not doing this at all.
The other problem that might be raised concerns the practical
side of reporting. What officer will want to fill out a form, even a
simple one, for every traffic stop? Police are already busy trying to do
the job we send them out to do. Why should they do extra paperwork
to help study thatjob? The first answer to this objection is that many
police departments already request a short report on every stop,
whether or not the officer issues a citation or a warning. The second
answer lies with technology. Already, many police vehicles carry not
just radios, but computer terminals that can be used to check a car's
license plate number or a motorist's drivers license, or to see if a person is wanted on outstanding warrants. It would take little more to
enter the basic information on traffic stops discussed above into such
a computer. The process would involve little more than punching
agreed-upon code numbers into the available machine. In fact, small
hand-held units now exist that can handle quite a bit of simple data.
Waiters and waitresses in restaurants sometimes carry these small devices, on which an order can be taken, transmitted to the kitchen,
tallied for billing purposes, and then saved for marketing and other
business purposes. Such a machine would be more than capable of
receiving and storing the relatively small amount of data that would be
generated by traffic stops, and transfer of the data into analyzable
form would involve no extra work. Another possibility is to do what
Volusia County did: have the police cars in departments under study
fitted with video cameras which would be turned on and off each time
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a stop was made. This arrangement would also benefit the police by
providing evidence in stops resulting in arrests. Police could simply
turn the tapes in, without having to do extra paperwork. Researchers
would then gather the statistics. While particulars would have to be
worked out, using video cameras might be the easiest way to do this.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Whren leaves us in an unsatisfactory situation. Any time we use
our cars, we can be stopped by the police virtually at their whim because full compliance with traffic laws is impossible. And we can feel
relatively certain that past will be prologue: African-Americans and
Hispanics will suffer the bulk of this treatment. Whites will not have
to endure it very often; if they did, it probably would not happen.
And, once police stop drivers, the officers will be able to search almost
everyone they want, some with consent and others with dogs. I, for
one, feel considerably less than comfortable with this outcome.
We may not always agree on the full contours of the Fourth
Amendment, but if nothing else it stands for-indeed, imposes-restraint on the government's power over the individual in the pursuit
of crime. At the very least, the police must have a reason-probable
cause, or at least reasonable suspicion-to pursue, stop and search
citizens. The point is not that the police are powerless until criminals
strike, but rather that police cannot treat everyone like a criminal in
order that some secretive wrongdoers be caught. From every practical
vantage point, Whren upends this venerable and sensible principle in
the name of the war on drugs. Its implications are clear: everyone is
fair game; members of minority groups will pay the largest price, but
there are casualties in war, so African-Americans and Hispanics will
just have to bear the cost. The Supreme Court could have used Whren
as an occasion to repudiate the worst of what this tragic and ultimately
unwinnable war has brought us. Instead, it increased police power
and discretion. We are all the losers for it, but unfortunately some of
us-those of us with dark skin-will lose a lot more than the rest.
Perhaps police departmental regulation, and further study, can lead
us in new directions.

